• This event has passed.

Szilvia PAPAI (Concordia) – “Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences (joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam)”

May 6 @ 12:15 pm - 1:30 pm

Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 06/05/2026
Salle : 3001

Szilvia PAPAI (Concordia) – “Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences (joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam)”

CV :  We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents have dichotomous preferences and the other side has strict preferences or priorities. We present a new mechanism that satisfies many desirable properties, including individually rationality, maximum size, stability, Pareto-efficiency on both sides, and strategyproofness for both sides.

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST

+ Google Calendar+ iCal Export