Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 14/10/2026
Salle : 3001

Sandro SHELEGIA (Pompeu Fabra) – “Impressing the Algorithm: Sales-Based Ranking, Learning, and Off-Platform Pricing (with Heski Bar Isaac)”

CV : We study how platform ranking design shapes sellers’ off-platform pricing when the platform learns product appeal from on-platform sales. Because those sales depend on cross-channel pricing, ranking creates a career-concerns force: by restraining off-platform discounts, the seller shifts demand on-platform and improves future exposure. Thus, even without conditioning directly on off-platform prices, a sales-based algorithm can reproduce the incentive effects of explicit price-parity restrictions. But because the platform also relies on  on-platform sales to infer seller appeal, a sales-based algorithm may distort promotion decisions and reduce welfare. We compare sales-based algorithms with rules that condition directly on off-platform prices and show that a price-parity-clause algorithm can attain the first best.

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST