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DTSTART:20260329T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260506T121500
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SUMMARY:Szilvia PAPAI (Concordia) - "Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences (joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam)"
DESCRIPTION:Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis\nHeure : 12h15 – 13h30\nDate : 06/05/2026\nSalle : 3001 \nSzilvia PAPAI (Concordia) – “Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences (joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam)” \nCV :  We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents have dichotomous preferences and the other side has strict preferences or priorities. We present a new mechanism that satisfies many desirable properties\, including individually rationality\, maximum size\, stability\, Pareto-efficiency on both sides\, and strategyproofness for both sides. \nOrganisateurs : \nJulien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)\n​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \nCommanditaires :\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/szilvia-papai-concordia-tba/
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics,Seminars
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