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2020
Fiscal rules as bargaining chips
The review of economic studies, vol. 88, iss. 5, pp. 2439-2478, 2020.
By F. Piguillem and A. Riboni@article{10.1093/restud/rdaa080, author={Piguillem, Facundo and Riboni, Alessandro}, title={Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips}, journal={The Review of Economic Studies}, volume={88}, number={5}, pages={2439-2478}, year={2020}, month={11}, abstract={Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as “bargaining chips” to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt-accumulation problem. We analyse various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g. government shutdown) maximize the opposition’s bargaining power and lead to lower debt accumulation. When polarization is low, less strict fiscal limits (e.g. balanced-budget rule) are preferable. Moreover, we find that the optimal fiscal rules could arise in equilibrium by negotiation. Finally, by insuring against power fluctuations, negotiable rules yield higher welfare than hard ones.}, issn={0034-6527}, doi={10.1093/restud/rdaa080}, url={https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa080}, eprint={https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-pdf/88/5/2439/40350149/rdaa080.pdf}, }Nation-building, nationalism, and wars ∗
Journal of economic growth, vol. 25, iss. 4, pp. 381-430, 2020.
By A. Alesina, B. Reich, and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Alesina2020381, author={Alesina, A. and Reich, B. and Riboni, A.}, title={Nation-building, nationalism, and wars ∗}, journal={Journal of Economic Growth}, year={2020}, volume={25}, number={4}, pages={381-430}, doi={10.1007/s10887-020-09182-7}, note={cited
By 0}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85091466701&doi=10.1007%2fs10887-020-09182-7&partnerID=40&md5=b20e588e0ea02cb97c118dcf9f578dc5}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }Legal efficiency and consistency
European economic review, vol. 121, 2020.
By L. Anderlini, L. Felli, and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Anderlini2020, author={Anderlini, L. and Felli, L. and Riboni, A.}, title={Legal efficiency and consistency}, journal={European Economic Review}, year={2020}, volume={121}, doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103323}, art_number={103323}, note={cited
By 0}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85074162274&doi=10.1016%2fj.euroecorev.2019.103323&partnerID=40&md5=ebbf230e6d41b57ae786bc07018fe719}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }
![[DOI]](https://crest.science/wp-content/plugins/papercite/img/external.png){kind=small}
2019
Mind-changes at the fomc
Economics letters, vol. 184, 2019.
By A. Riboni and F. Ruge-Murcia@ARTICLE{Riboni2019, author={Riboni, A. and Ruge-Murcia, F.}, title={Mind-changes at the FOMC}, journal={Economics Letters}, year={2019}, volume={184}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108565}, art_number={108565}, note={cited
By 0}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85071833139&doi=10.1016%2fj.econlet.2019.108565&partnerID=40&md5=43eb058155fca3deb3616a724d76963d}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }
2018
Fiscal rules as bargaining chips
, iss. 1804, 2018.
By F. Piguillem and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{RePEc:eie:wpaper:1804, author={Facundo Piguillem and Alessandro Riboni}, title={Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips}, year=2018, month=, institution={Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)}, type={EIEF Working Papers Series}, url={https://ideas.repec.org/p/eie/wpaper/1804.html}, number={1804}, keywords={}, doi={}, }
2017
Collective versus individual decision-making: a case study of the bank of israel law
European economic review, vol. 93, pp. 73-89, 2017.
By F. Ruge-Murcia and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Ruge-Murcia201773, author={Ruge-Murcia, F. and Riboni, A.}, title={Collective versus individual Decision-Making: A case study of the Bank of Israel Law}, journal={European Economic Review}, year={2017}, volume={93}, pages={73-89}, doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.01.003}, note={cited
By 0}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85013073489&doi=10.1016%2fj.euroecorev.2017.01.003&partnerID=40&md5=2dc258ade362d33c63e15d8c51d60b4d}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }
2015
Doubts and dogmatism in conflict behaviour
The economic journal, , 2015.
By S. Gordon and A. Riboni@article{gordon:hal-01408877, author={Gordon, Sidartha and Riboni, Alessandro}, title={Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour}, journal={The Economic Journal}, year={2015}, }Doubts and dogmatism in conflict behaviour
Economic journal, vol. 125, iss. 589, pp. 1790-1817, 2015.
By S. Gordon and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Gordon20151790, author={Gordon, S. and Riboni, A.}, title={Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour}, journal={Economic Journal}, year={2015}, volume={125}, number={589}, pages={1790-1817}, doi={10.1111/ecoj.12326}, note={cited
By 0}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84954462372&doi=10.1111%2fecoj.12326&partnerID=40&md5=6f7ec2284d668aa99d79a25654287551}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }Spending-biased legislators: discipline through disagreement
Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 130, iss. 2, pp. 901-949, 2015.
By F. Piguillem and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Piguillem2015901, author={Piguillem, F. and Riboni, A.}, title={Spending-biased legislators: Discipline through disagreement}, journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year={2015}, volume={130}, number={2}, pages={901-949}, doi={10.1093/qje/qjv011}, art_number={qjv011}, note={cited
By 6}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84929678145&doi=10.1093%2fqje%2fqjv011&partnerID=40&md5=34c0456383726a2ff5411243802e57d1}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }
2014
Why stare decisis?
Review of economic dynamics, vol. 17, iss. 4, pp. 726-738, 2014.
By L. Anderlini, L. Felli, and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Anderlini2014726, author={Anderlini, L. and Felli, L. and Riboni, A.}, title={Why stare decisis?}, journal={Review of Economic Dynamics}, year={2014}, volume={17}, number={4}, pages={726-738}, doi={10.1016/j.red.2014.02.001}, note={cited
By 5}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84910147349&doi=10.1016%2fj.red.2014.02.001&partnerID=40&md5=34e7fece9e7fd5305df0a094aeae3687}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }Dissent in monetary policy decisions
Journal of monetary economics, vol. 66, pp. 137-154, 2014.
By A. Riboni and F. Ruge-Murcia@ARTICLE{Riboni2014137, author={Riboni, A. and Ruge-Murcia, F.}, title={Dissent in monetary policy decisions}, journal={Journal of Monetary Economics}, year={2014}, volume={66}, pages={137-154}, doi={10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.03.006}, note={cited
By 11}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84905159485&doi=10.1016%2fj.jmoneco.2014.03.006&partnerID=40&md5=a38844ba9a657b2ab13747439d4695bc}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }
2013
Legal institutions, innovation, and growth
International economic review, vol. 54, iss. 3, pp. 937-956, 2013.
By L. Anderlini, L. Felli, G. Immordino, and A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Anderlini2013937, author={Anderlini, L. and Felli, L. and Immordino, G. and Riboni, A.}, title={Legal institutions, innovation, and growth}, journal={International Economic Review}, year={2013}, volume={54}, number={3}, pages={937-956}, doi={10.1111/iere.12023}, note={cited
By 14}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84880429676&doi=10.1111%2fiere.12023&partnerID=40&md5=8a90bec6b23f7e797225c87992c09e10}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }Ideology and endogenous constitutions
Economic theory, vol. 52, iss. 3, pp. 885-913, 2013.
By A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Riboni2013885, author={Riboni, A.}, title={Ideology and endogenous constitutions}, journal={Economic Theory}, year={2013}, volume={52}, number={3}, pages={885-913}, doi={10.1007/s00199-011-0668-9}, note={cited
By 2}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84876301571&doi=10.1007%2fs00199-011-0668-9&partnerID=40&md5=a8d340719a242af9974a924618bc15b8}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }
2010
Committees as substitutes for commitment
International economic review, vol. 51, iss. 1, pp. 213-236, 2010.
By A. Riboni@ARTICLE{Riboni2010213, author={Riboni, A.}, title={Committees as substitutes for commitment}, journal={International Economic Review}, year={2010}, volume={51}, number={1}, pages={213-236}, doi={10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00577.x}, note={cited
By 10}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-77950194501&doi=10.1111%2fj.1468-2354.2009.00577.x&partnerID=40&md5=83f32c7fb32b19b114b409b6e6ffd3b5}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }Monetary policy by committee: consensus, chairman dominance, or simple majority?
Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 125, iss. 1, pp. 363-416, 2010.
By A. Riboni and F. J. Ruge-Murcia@ARTICLE{Riboni2010363, author={Riboni, A. and Ruge-Murcia, F.J.}, title={Monetary policy by committee: Consensus, chairman dominance, or simple majority?}, journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year={2010}, volume={125}, number={1}, pages={363-416}, doi={10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.363}, note={cited
By 40}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-76049117984&doi=10.1162%2fqjec.2010.125.1.363&partnerID=40&md5=cc2aee82a972f52a6ce367436909f151}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }
2008
The dynamic (in)efficiency of monetary policy by committee
Journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 40, iss. 5, pp. 1001-1032, 2008.
By A. Riboni and F. J. Ruge-Murcia@ARTICLE{Riboni20081001, author={Riboni, A. and Ruge-Murcia, F.J.}, title={The dynamic (in)efficiency of monetary policy by committee}, journal={Journal of Money, Credit and Banking}, year={2008}, volume={40}, number={5}, pages={1001-1032}, doi={10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00144.x}, note={cited
By 19}, url={https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-47749104897&doi=10.1111%2fj.1538-4616.2008.00144.x&partnerID=40&md5=1b7f2002aa8fbc37d869b1742b410d4c}, document_type={Article}, source={Scopus}, }