Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 12/03/2025
Salle : 3001

Shigehiro SERIZAWA (Osaka University of Economics) – “Constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness in constrained package assignment problems with money”

CV : We consider the constrained package assignment problem with money, where a finite set M of objects is assigned among agents. Each agent receives a set of objects and makes a payment, having a preference over pairs consisting of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Admissible object allocations are constrained to achieve a planner’s goal. An allocation is constrained efficient if its object allocation is admissible and no other allocation with an admissible object allocation Pareto-dominates it. We focus on the compatibility between constraints on object allocations and desirable properties of rules, and investigate rules that satisfy these properties together with constraints. First, we show that if there exists a rule satisfying constrained efficiency, no wastage, equal treatment of equals, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy, then the set of admissible object allocations is bundling unit-demand for some partition of M, and satisfies no wastage and anonymity. Second, by applying the results of Demange and Gale (1985), Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), and Wakabayashi et al. (2025), we show that a rule satisfies constrained efficiency, no wastage, equal treatment of equals, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy if and only if the set of admissible object allocations of the rule is bundling unit-demand for some partition of M, and satisfies no wastage and anonymity, and the rule is a bundling minimum price Warlasian rule.

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST