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Nikhil VELLODI (PSE) – “Self-Prospecting: Optimal Experimentation Under Present-Bias”

September 17, 2025 @ 12:15 pm - 1:30 pm

Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 17/09/2026
Salle : 3001

Nikhil VELLODI (PSE) – “Self-Prospecting: Optimal Experimentation Under Present-Bias”

CV : A present-biased decision maker (DM) faces a two-armed bandit problem whose risky arm generates random payoffs at exponentially distributed times. Under full information, the DM’s belief remains unchanged prior to payoff arrivals, generating a “lumpy” belief process that updates infrequently but conclusively. Our main finding is that coarsening the DM’s information to foster `”gradual optimism” – a continuously increasing path of beliefs during active experimentation – helps motivate the DM more effectively and deliver them greater welfare. We relate our findings to those in behavioral psychology relating to motivation, learning, and self-control, and apply our results to parenting and pedagogy.

Joint work with : Polina Borisova (PSE)

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST