Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 22/11/2023
Salle : 3001

Margarita KIRNEVA (CREST) – “Informing to Divert Attention” –

Abstract : I study a multidimensional Sender-Receiver game in which Receiver can acquire limited information after observing the Sender’s signal. Depending on the parameters describing the conflict of interest between Sender and Receiver, I characterise optimal information disclosure and the information acquired by Receiver as a response. I show that in the case of partial conflict of interests (aligned on some dimensions and misaligned on others) Sender uses the multidimensionality of the environment to divert Receiver’s attention away from the dimensions of misalignment of interests. Moreover, there is negative value of information in the sense that Receiver would be better off if she could commit not to extract private information or to have access to information of lower quality. I present applications to informational lobbying and consumer’s choice.

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST