Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 25/03/2026
Salle : 3001

Sophie BADE (Royal Holloway) – “Open-ended Matching with and without Markets”

CV : Suppose agents are to be matched to objects and arrive over time without a definite terminal date. Although the set of core matchings can then be empty, a transfinite version of the top trading algorithm shows that Pareto-optimal weak-core matchings always exist. Optimal matchings face a difficulty however: some of the agents linked by chains of trades may have lifespans that do not overlap, thus obstructing their trades. To address this problem, we let matchings be implemented via competitive markets. Competitive equilibria always exist and any matching in the core can be completely implemented. Moreover full core equivalence, where allocations are in the core if and only if they can be completely implemented, holds for a dense set of models. The extended algorithm also yields a strategyproof mechanism, comparably to the finite model.

Organisateurs : 

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST