Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 22/05/2024
Salle : 3001

David MARTIMORT (Toulouse School of Economics) – “Screening Contracts as a Barrier to Entry (with Jérôme Pouyet and Lars Stole)”

CV : A seller contracts with a downstream buyer under the threat of upstream entry. The buyer has private information both on his demand and on the efficiency gains of entry. Strategic and screening concerns interact in the design of nonlinear contracts. We provide a rationale for the use of rebates, discounts and minimal purchase requirements under various contracting scenarios. With market-share contracts, the incumbent designs nonlinear tariffs that depend on whether the buyer also purchases from the entrant. Screening distortions are mitigated and the incumbent’s marginal prices come closer to, but remain above, marginal cost when entry occurs. Entry is inefficient, reduced to decrease the buyer’s information rent, but it remains positively correlated with consumption. When restricted to offer a single unconditional nonlinear tariff, the incumbent faces a conflict between preventing entry and screening. Entry is no longer positively correlated with consumption and marginal prices may be lower than marginal cost. The optimal unconditional contract shares key features of an all-unit discount tariff.

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST