BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CREST - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CREST
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://crest.science
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20240331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20241027T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20240522T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20240522T133000
DTSTAMP:20260710T185353
CREATED:20240423T070949Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240521T060928Z
UID:16990-1716380100-1716384600@crest.science
SUMMARY:David MARTIMORT (Toulouse School of Economics) - “Screening Contracts as a Barrier to Entry (with Jérôme Pouyet and Lars Stole)"
DESCRIPTION:Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis\nHeure : 12h15 – 13h30\nDate : 22/05/2024\nSalle : 3001 \nDavid MARTIMORT (Toulouse School of Economics) – “Screening Contracts as a Barrier to Entry (with Jérôme Pouyet and Lars Stole)” \nCV : A seller contracts with a downstream buyer under the threat of upstream entry. The buyer has private information both on his demand and on the efficiency gains of entry. Strategic and screening concerns interact in the design of nonlinear contracts. We provide a rationale for the use of rebates\, discounts and minimal purchase requirements under various contracting scenarios. With market-share contracts\, the incumbent designs nonlinear tariffs that depend on whether the buyer also purchases from the entrant. Screening distortions are mitigated and the incumbent’s marginal prices come closer to\, but remain above\, marginal cost when entry occurs. Entry is inefficient\, reduced to decrease the buyer’s information rent\, but it remains positively correlated with consumption. When restricted to offer a single unconditional nonlinear tariff\, the incumbent faces a conflict between preventing entry and screening. Entry is no longer positively correlated with consumption and marginal prices may be lower than marginal cost. The optimal unconditional contract shares key features of an all-unit discount tariff. \nOrganisateurs : \nJulien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)\n​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)\n​​​​​​​​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \nCommanditaires :\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/david-martimort-toulouse-school-of-economics-tba/
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics,Seminars
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR