An interview with Julien Prat in Polytechnique Insights – November 10th, 2021
Market equilibrium with management costs and implications for insurance accounting
CREST Working Papers Series No. 2021-22
by Olivier Gossner and Michael Florig
When is a life worth living? A dynastic efficiency criterion for fertility decisions
CREST Working Papers Series No. 2021-21
No Regret Fiscal Reforms
CREST Working Papers Series No. 2021-20
Open Economy Secular Stagnation and Financial Integration
CREST Working Papers Series No. 2021-19
Inequality and Earnings Dynamics in France: National Policies and Local Consequences
CREST Working Papers Series No. 2021-18
by Francis Kramarz, Elio Nimier-David and Thomas Delemotte
Call for paper: Conference on “Individual Risks and the Macroeconomy”
Submission deadline: February 15th, 2022
Market Entry, Fighting Brands, and Tacit Collusion
A paper published in the American Economic Review, co-authored by Yutec Sun, Marc Bourreau, Frank Verboven
Tax inheritance to reduce more income tax?
An interview with Bertrand Garbinti in Polytechnique Insights
Pierre-Edouard Collignon
- Personal website:
https://sites.google.com/view/pe-collignon
- Email address:
pierre.edouard.collignon@ensae.fr
- Research description:
Pierre-Edouard a doctoral student at CREST – École polytechnique. His main research interests are Macroeconomics and Public Finance with a special focus on time inconsistency issues in optimal dynamic fiscal policy. His secondary research interests are Welfare Economics and Population Ethics.
- JMP:
Title: No Regret Fiscal Reforms
Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/18gMtZrXqSgDy32_TwN_BLGzb-gk3bmCq/view?usp=sharing
- JMP Abstract:
How should fiscal policy react to shocks ex post while preserving incentives to work and save ex ante? The standard solution involves a commitment to a contingent policy, whereby the initial government sets all the policies for all future states of the world. Contingent policies are unrealistic. As an alternative, this paper introduces ”No Regret Fiscal Reforms”: the government may freely change its fiscal policy provided households do not regret their past decisions. Hence flexibility is provided and incentives to work and save are preserved. Such reforms can be achieved by changing taxes on both capital and labour such that wealth effects exactly compensate substitution effects. In a representative agent framework, I study how a benevolent government optimally uses No Regret fiscal reforms and compare them to optimal contingent policies. Both approaches yield very similar allocations and optimal No Regret reforms only lead to small welfare losses. Second, I consider Near-Rational Expectations i.e the government recognizes that agents’ beliefs about the distribution of shocks may be different from its own and wants to implement a policy robust to this unknown difference. No Regret fiscal reforms are fully robust to this departure from rational expectations. Finally, I study No Regret fiscal reforms with wealth and skill heterogeneity.