Personal website:

https://sites.google.com/view/margarita-kirneva/home

Contact:

margarita.kirneva@ensae.fr; margarita.kirneva@polytechnique.edu

Research fields:

Primary fields: Microeconomic Theory
Secondary fields: Game Theory, Political Economy, Social Choice

Presentation: 

Margarita Kirneva is a doctoral student at CREST – Ecole Polytechnique. Her main research interest is Microeconomic theory with a special focus on strategic infromation transmission and its applications to political economy and industrial organization. She also works on the design of “good” voting mechanisms.

Job Market Paper:

Informing to Divert Attention
Abstract: I study a multidimensional Sender-Receiver game in which Receiver can acquire limited information after observing the Sender’s signal. Depending on the parameters describing the conflict of interest between Sender and Receiver, I characterise optimal information disclosure and the information acquired by Receiver as a response. I show that in the case of partial conflict of interests (aligned on some dimensions and misaligned on others) Sender uses the multidimensionality of the environment to divert Receiver’s attention away from the dimensions of misalignment of interests. Moreover, there is negative value of information in the sense that Receiver would be better off if she could commit not to extract private information or to have access to information of lower quality. I present applications to informational lobbying and consumer’s choice.

Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WMUkP4rrnzdb0mouMFuFkqPSyAhZzKJM/view?usp=drive_link