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12:15 pm
Szilvia PAPAI (Concordia) – “Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences (joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam)”
Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis Heure : 12h15 - 13h30 Date : 06/05/2026 Salle : 3001 Szilvia PAPAI (Concordia) - "Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences (joint work with Haris Aziz and Shahidul Islam)" CV : We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents have dichotomous preferences and the other side has strict preferences […]
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