Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 04/11/2026
Salle : 3001

Scott SAAS (HEC) – “Signal Disclosure in Information Design”

CV : This paper studies the information design environment in which the designer is restricted to using messages that players can publicly and verifiably disclose. I employ a belief-based approach to characterizing the designer’s optimal payoff among the implementable outcomes, utilizing the methods of Mathevet, Perego and Taneva (2020). Unlike in the standard information design environment, the designer’s optimal outcome may require an indirect information structure. It is without loss for the designer to send messages specifying a player’s full beliefs and a menu of contingent action recommendations. I apply these results to a class of games which I call leader-follower games. If a leader-follower game has positive spillovers, then a designer with increasing preferences can do no better than public information, even when the designer could strictly benefit from private signals in the standard environment. If the game does not have positive spillovers, private information may still be valuable under signal disclosure.

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST