The Microeconimics Seminar: 
Time: 12:15 pm – 1:30pm
Date: 3rd October 2018
Place: Room 3001.
Anastasios DOSIS (ESSEC) – “On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values”

Abstract:

This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and common values and makes the following contributions. First, it provides a useful property of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation. Based on this property, an alternative, more robust, and perhaps simpler, proof of Theorem 1 (i.e., the main result) of Maskin and Tirole (1992) is constructed. Second, it shows that if the principal is restricted to offering mechanisms in which only she makes announcements (e.g., direct revelation mechanisms), then the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds even in environments in which the RSW allocation is not interim efficient relative to any non-degenerate beliefs. Finally, it provides a weaker than the no-tangency condition that allows for the complete characterisation of the set of equilibrium allocations.

Organizers:
Roxana Fernandez Machado (CREST), Marie Laure Allain (CREST), and Pierre Boyer (CREST)
Sponsors:
CREST
Lunch registration:
food provided, no registration needed