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Rafael Veiel – "Complexity of Strategic Thinking and Robustness of Interim Rationalizability"
CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics :
Date: 08th May 2019
Place: Room 3105.
Rafael Veiel – “Complexity of Strategic Thinking and Robustness of Interim Rationalizability”
Abstract: In games of incomplete information Interim rationalizability is the equilibrium concept that stems from iterative deletion of dominated strategies. It is known that this solution concept can be sensitive to small misspecifications of players’ beliefs and higher order beliefs. We introduce a measure to capture the complexity of strategic thinking in a game and show that interim rationalizable strategies are robust to perturbations of players’ beliefs as long as they preserve the order of complexity of strategic thinking.
Alexis Larousse (CREST)
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