Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 13/05/2026
Salle : 3001

Marco SCARSINI (LUISS) – “A Characterization of Universally Optimal Queueing Regimes”

CV : We consider an M/M/\uD835\uDC60 queueing model where, based on the service reward and on the waiting cost, customers can strategically decide upon arrival whether to enter the queue or to balk, and, at any given time, whether to stay in the queue or to renege. The strategic behavior of rational customers produces an equilibrium whose outcome can be socially efficient or inefficient, depending on the queueing regime. Some regimes for which the equilibrium is efficient require a precise calibration that depends on all the model parameters. Some other regimes are universally optimal, i.e., their equilibrium outcome is efficient for every value of the parameters. Universal optimality is clearly an appealing property for a planner who is in charge of choosing a queueing regime. We characterize the class of universally optimal queueing regimes. A by-product of this characterization is the unavoidable role of preemption in universally optimal regimes. (Joint with Eran Shmaya)

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yuki TAMURA (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST