Salle 3001

Kerstin HOLZHEU (Sciences-Po) “Wage Bargaining and Wage Posting Firms”

Abstract: This paper characterizes wage bargaining and wage posting firms. Using a theoretically derived likelihood-based estimation and clustering algorithm, we classify firms into either wage-bargaining or wage-posting types. Empirically, we leverage survey data from Germany and administrative data from Austria and find strikingly similar characterizations of both firm types. We find that wage-bargaining firms, which account for about 43% of Austrian firms and 43% of German firms, exhibit higher productivity and within-firm wage variation. Our model explains job-to-job mobility with wage decreases as workers trade current wages at posting firms for potential future gains at bargaining firms. Ensuing inefficient mobility accounts for 11–17% of worker transitions and about 1-2% of output losses.

Joint work : Jean-Marc ROBIN (Sciences-Po)

Organizer : Suzanne BELLUE