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Harry Di Pei (Northwestern University) – "Reputation Building with Endogenous Speed of Learning"
November 6, 2019 @ 12:15 am - 1:30 pm
CREST Microeconomics Seminar :
Time: 12:15 pm – 1:30pm
Date: 6th Nov. 2019
Place: Room 3001.
Harry Di Pei (Northwestern University) – Reputation Building with Endogenous Speed of Learning
Abstract: “I study reputation models where each short-run player observes a (possibly stochastic) bounded subset of the long-run player’s previous period actions, in addition to the entire history of her predecessors’ actions. Reputation effects fail because the speed of learning decreases endogenously with the long-run player’s patience. When each short-run player can also observe an informative signal about the long-run player’s current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation effects fail. This is because the short-run player’s action can be uninformative about the long-run player’s type in periods where the latter receives a low stage-game payoff. When the environment is not resistent to learning, the patient long-run player can secure his commitment payoff in all equilibria. I explain the differences between my resistent to learning condition and the bounded informativeness condition in observational learning models.”
Date: 6th Nov. 2019
Place: Room 3001.
Harry Di Pei (Northwestern University) – Reputation Building with Endogenous Speed of Learning
Abstract: “I study reputation models where each short-run player observes a (possibly stochastic) bounded subset of the long-run player’s previous period actions, in addition to the entire history of her predecessors’ actions. Reputation effects fail because the speed of learning decreases endogenously with the long-run player’s patience. When each short-run player can also observe an informative signal about the long-run player’s current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation effects fail. This is because the short-run player’s action can be uninformative about the long-run player’s type in periods where the latter receives a low stage-game payoff. When the environment is not resistent to learning, the patient long-run player can secure his commitment payoff in all equilibria. I explain the differences between my resistent to learning condition and the bounded informativeness condition in observational learning models.”
Organizers:
Roxana Fernandez Machado (CREST), Marie Laure Allain (CREST), and Linda Schilling (CREST)
Sponsors:
CREST
Lunch registration:
food provided, no registration needed
Sponsors:
CREST
Lunch registration:
food provided, no registration needed