Time: 11:00 am – 12:00pm
Date: 17th June 2019
Place: Room 3105.
 David Benatia – “Strategic Reneging in Sequential Imperfect Markets”

Abstract: This paper investigates the incentives to manipulate sequential markets by strategically reneging on forward commitments. First, we study the behavior of a monopolist in a two-period model with demand uncertainty. Our results deliver guidance for identifying manipulations and evaluating its market impacts. Second, we test the model’s predictions using occurrences of reneging on long-term commitments in Alberta’s electricity market. We implement a machine learning approach to identify and evaluate manipulations. We find that a dominant supplier increased its revenues by $32 million in five months, causing Alberta’s electricity procurement costs to increase by above $300 million.

Organizers:
Alexis Larousse (CREST)
Sponsors:
CREST
Lunch registration:
no registration needed