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Daniel Waldinger (NYU) – "Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation"
Microeconomics Seminar :
Time: 4:00pm – 5:15pm
Date: 16th June 2021
Room: VISIO
Daniel Waldinger (NYU) – “Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation”
Abstract: Public housing benefits are rationed through waitlists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using waitlist data from Cambridge, MA. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution.
Roxana Fernandez Machado (CREST), Julien Combe (CREST), and Matias Nunez (CREST)
Sponsors:
CREST