SInfoNiA – Strategic Information: New Directions and Applications
In a world saturated with data, the role of information as a coordination device for economic activity is more and more central, and impacts phenomena such as financial crises, currency attacks and social stability.
Although the importance of information as a driving force is well established, current models of coordination and robustness are limited to the restricted class of binary actions supermodular games.
Following recent methodological advances of the PI as a proof of concept, the project offers a model of strategic types that will define the role of information in general strategic situations.
Our methodology diverges from the conventional approach by reframing all information in relation to the game under study. Rather than considering information description as a distinct entity separate from the game itself, our approach centers on strategically relevant information within a particular, predetermined game context.
SInfoNiA will create new foundations for the analysis of information in economics, and delve into new positive and normative implications of the theory as described in 7 work packages (WP).
The first 4 WPs are methodological, they provide a model of strategic types for a wide array of games (WP1), develop new avenues to the measure and value of information (WP2), unify strategic types with global games information structures (WP3), and offer algorithms that will allow for wide applicability and dissemination of the methods (WP4).
WP5 utilizes these methods to expand the global games frontier and to analyze new models of financial stability, while WP6 will offer a broad analysis of the robustness of economic outcomes, including in trade and financial networks.
WP7 takes a normative approach and provides joint design of information structures and incentives that efficiently implement desirable outcomes. It offers informational interventions to bring on changes in social norms, in particular in gender inequality.
Funded by the European Union (ERC, SInfoNiA, 101142530). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
Olivier Gossner – Principal investigator
Olivier Gossner is a Professor at Ecole polytechnique and researcher at CREST-CNRS. Olivier is a specialist of Game Theory working at the intersection of Economics and Mathematics. His main research interests lie in repeated games, the strategic use of information, and bounded rationality.
In recent work, he develops new models of strategic reasoning, and proposed a reform of Solvency II that would allow to allocate more insurance capital to the productive economy.
He is a fellow and the vice president for communications of the Game Theory society.
Her fields of research are Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics and Family Economics.