Applied Micro Seminar : Every Tuesday
Time: 12:15 pm – 13:30 pm
Date: March, 31th
Room : 3001

Amelie SCHIPROWSKI  “Reducing Mandatory Job Applications in Unemployment Insurance”

Abstract : 

In this paper, we estimate the effects of a large-scale reduction in job applications by unemployment benefit recipients. We exploit a policy experiment in Switzerland, where a subset of public employment services significantly reduced the number of required applications and the use of vacancy referrals. Using detailed administrative data and difference-in-differences designs, we find that the policy change led to an increase of about 6% in the average duration of unemployment spells. Exploiting additional variation in caseworkers’ pre-reform use of vacancy referrals, we show that the reduction in application quantity (search requirement) and the increase in selectivity (vacancy referrals) each account for approximately half of the overall effect. Based on these estimates, we back out an elasticity of job finding to applications of approximately 0.13. Finally, the policy change led to an average 2% increase in reemployment earnings, primarily driven by the reduced use of vacancy referrals. The findings suggest that policies restricting individuals’ selectivity in job search involve significant trade-offs between unemployment duration and reemployment earnings.

Organizers:
Benoît SCHMUTZ (Pôle économie du CREST)
Clément MALGOUYRES (Pôle économie du CREST)

Sponsors:
CREST