Time: 12:15 pm – 1:30pm
Date: 26th June 2019
Place: Room 3001.
 Frederic Koessler (PSE) – “Long Information Design” with M. Laclau, J. Renault and T. Tomala

Abstract:”We study competitive information design games between two designers who want to influence the final action of a decision-maker. Each designer controls the public information on a private persistent state: in each period the designers can disclose information to the decision-maker about their own state. Using tools from repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, we study equilibrium payoffs and strategies depending on the timing of the game and the possible deadline. Our analysis covers continuous environments as well as environments in which designers can only induce finite sets of posterior beliefs: in the latter framework, there may be no bound on the number of communication stages required at equilibrium.”

Organizers:
Roxana Fernandez Machado (CREST), Marie Laure Allain (CREST), and Linda Schilling (CREST)
Sponsors:
CREST
Lunch registration:
food provided, no registration needed