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DTSTART:20250330T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250306T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250306T233000
DTSTAMP:20260710T153548
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SUMMARY:Jan Starmans (Stockholm School of Economics) "Sustainable Investing and Market Governance"
DESCRIPTION:Quantitative Sustainable Economics and Finance \nTime: 10.30 am\nDate: 06th of March 2025\nRoom 3001 \nJan Starmans (Stockholm School of Economics) “Sustainable Investing and Market Governance” \nAbstract :This paper examines how sustainable investing affects the traditional governance role of financial markets. We show that stronger pro-social preferences among informed investors can reduce price informativeness about managerial effort toward improving financial performance\, thereby increasing the cost of incentive provision. While this creates an agency cost\, it can paradoxically generate positive real effects: because firms generating negative externalities face higher agency costs\, purely financially motivated shareholders have incentives to reduce externalities to enhance price informativeness for governance purposes. Our results reveal an inherent link between firms’ environmental and social (the “ES” of ESG) and governance (the “G” of ESG) outcomes. We also identify a novel complementarity between voice and exit in reducing firm externalities—pro-social investors’ exit decisions prompt financial investors to exercise voice—in contrast to the conventional view of these strategies being substitutes. \nJoint work :Deeksha Gupta (Johns Hopkins University)\, Alvin Chen (Stockholm School of Economics | Swedish House of Finance) \nOrganizers:  Patricia Crifo\, Emmanuel Gobet\, Peter Tankov\, Gauthier Vermandel\, and Olivier David Zerbib \nSponsors:\nCREST-CMAP \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/jan-starmans-stockholm-school-of-economics-t-b-a/
CATEGORIES:Finance-Insurance,Quantitative Sustainable Economics and Finance,Seminars
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250306T113000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250306T123000
DTSTAMP:20260710T153548
CREATED:20250210T071316Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250210T071316Z
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SUMMARY:Adelina BARBALAU (HEC Paris & University of Alberta) "The Optimal Design of Green Debt"
DESCRIPTION:Quantitative Sustainable Economics and Finance \nTime: 11.30 am\nDate: 06th of March 2025\nRoom 3001 \nAdelina BARBALAU (HEC Paris & University of Alberta) “The Optimal Design of Green Debt” \nAbstract :We develop a theory of optimal security design for financing green investments in the presence of greenwashing. Green outcomes are uncertain and can be obtained through the implementation of tangible projects and/or intangible effort-based strategies. When manipulation is not possible\, the optimal contract takes the form of an outcome-based security design\, similar to a sustainability-linked bond (SLB)\, with a payoff that is contingent on green outcomes. When manipulation is costless\, the optimal contract takes the form of a project-based security design\, similar to a green bond (GB)\, with a payoff that depends on the implementation of green projects. When green outcomes can be manipulated at some cost\, the optimal contract is a hybrid which incorporates both an outcome-contingency (like an SLBs) and a project-contingency (like a GB). The model rationalizes several empirical facts. \n  \nOrganizers:  Patricia Crifo\, Emmanuel Gobet\, Peter Tankov\, Gauthier Vermandel\, and Olivier David Zerbib \nSponsors:\nCREST-CMAP \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/adelina-barbalau-hec-paris-university-of-alberta-the-optimal-design-of-green-debt/
CATEGORIES:Finance-Insurance,Quantitative Sustainable Economics and Finance,Seminars
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