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SUMMARY:Market Power\, Randomization and Regulation\, Simon Loertscher (University of Melbourne)
DESCRIPTION:  \n\n\n\n  \n  \nSCHEDULE\n  \nMonday\n9th September 2024 \n16th September 2024\nFrom 9:00 to 12:15 \nFrom 13:30 to 16:45\n  \nRoom 2003\n\n\n  \nThursday\n  \n12th September 2024\n  \nFrom 13:30 to 16:45\n  \nRoom 2003\n\n\n\nOutline\nMonopoly and monopsony pricing problems are of long-standing interest in economics. With the\nemergence of large online platforms in the digital age\, they have received renewed salience and attention.\nThis course provides an overview of recent theoretical advances based on incomplete information models.\nThese shed new light on a broad array of issues\, ranging from the optimality of rationing and involuntary\nunemployment to resale\, opaque pricing by multi-product monopolies\, market definition in antitrust and\nmerger effects to optimal regulation in the tradition of Ramsey.\nThe incomplete information approach not only provides a coherent explanation for otherwise puzzling\nphenomena. For example\, why does the seller of concert tickets underprice these\, thereby inviting resale\,\nrather than set a market-clearing price? Why do multi-product sellers offer opaque products\, leaving buyers\nin the dark as to what they purchased until after the fact? It also implies that\, because of incentive\ncompatibility\, perfect price discrimination is not possible\, and it permits clear-cut predictions of the form\nprice discrimination takes\, with and without resale. By assuming that the firm always chooses the optimal\nmechanism\, the approach is immune to the criticism that its predictions hinge on ad-hoc restrictions. A\ntradeoff between social surplus and profit derives from the primitives. \n\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/market-power-randomization-and-regulation-simon-loertscher-university-of-melbourne/
CATEGORIES:Doctoral Courses,Economics
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