BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CREST - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CREST
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://crest.science
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20240331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20241027T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240612
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240613
DTSTAMP:20260712T162038
CREATED:20240307T073530Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240307T084132Z
UID:16774-1718150400-1718236799@crest.science
SUMMARY:Cyber Risk and Insurance France-Berkeley Conference
DESCRIPTION:[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text el_class=”showlist”]\nConference Objectives/Summary:\nCyber risk is a major concern for public entities and private companies and constitutes a systemic threat to the resilience of the financial and economic world. 1% of the world’s GDP goes up every year because of cyber-crime. Chair of the Federal Reserve of the United States\, Jerome Powell\, has stated that Cyberattacks are now the biggest threat to the financial system. Recent health and geopolitical crises amplify this threat: the Covid-19 pandemic has had a windfall effect on cybercriminals\, multiplying attacks such as ransomware\, and the war in Ukraine has illustrated the power of cyber-attacks as weapons of war. The emergent and evolving nature of risk\, its potential systemic component and its behavioral aspects challenge the resilience of economy and society and require in-depth mathematical modeling and actuarial analysis to better anticipate and mitigate this risk. \nThe Cyber Risk and Insurance France Berkeley Conference will bring together experts across different fields (actuaries\, cyber risk experts\, applied mathematicians) from France and Berkeley to present advances on the modeling of cyber risk and its consequences in economics. The France-Berkeley conference aims to advance modeling and better anticipate and mitigate cyber risk. \nThis conference is sponsored by the France-Berkeley Fund and the project “Mathematical modeling for cyber-risk insurance” led by Caroline Hillairet (ENSAE Paris) and Thibaut Mastrolia (UC Berkeley). \nOrganizing Committee:\n\nCaroline Hillairet\nThibaut Mastrolia\nWissal Sabbagh\n\nSpeakers:\n\nAnil Aswani (UC Berkeley)\nYousra Cherkaoui (ENSAE Paris)\nSukanya Kudva (UC Berkeley)\nOlivier Lopez (ENSAE Paris)\nAnthony Reveillac (INSA Toulouse)\nWissal Sabbagh (Le Mans Universite)\nDawn Song (UC Berkeley)\nUnal Tatar (University of Albany)\n\nDate: Wednesday\, June 12\, 2024 \nLocation: Etcheverry 1174\, 2521 Hearst Ave\, Berkeley\, CA 94709 \nRegister for the conference here. \nThe conference will be accessible remotely. \nWebsite of the conference: https://ieor.berkeley.edu/cyber-risk-and-insurance-france-berkeley-conference/[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/cyber-risk-and-insurance-france-berkeley-conference/
LOCATION:Etcheverry Hall\, Etcheverry 1174\, 2521 Hearst Ave\, Berkeley\, CA\, 94709\, United States
CATEGORIES:Conferences and Workshops,Finance-Insurance
ORGANIZER;CN="Caroline%20HILLAIRET":MAILTO:Caroline.Hillairet@ensae.fr
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20240612T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20240612T133000
DTSTAMP:20260712T162038
CREATED:20240603T061706Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240603T061802Z
UID:17068-1718194500-1718199000@crest.science
SUMMARY:Paula ONUCHIC (University of Oxford) - "Disclosure and Incentives in Teams"
DESCRIPTION:Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis\nHeure : 12h15 – 13h30\nDate : 12/06/2024\nSalle : 3001 \nPaula ONUCHIC (University of Oxford) – “Disclosure and Incentives in Teams” \nCV : We consider a team production environment augmented by a stage in which the team decides how to communicate its productive outcome to outside observers. In this context\, we characterize equilibrium disclosure of team outcomes when team disclosure choices aggregate individual recommendations through some deliberation procedure. We show that equilibria often involve partial disclosure of the team’s outcome and establish a relation between the deliberation procedure and the observer’s equilibrium attribution of blame for non-disclosed outcomes (“team failures”) across team members. We show that through this blame-attribution channel a team’s deliberation procedure determines individuals’ incentives to contribute effort to team production. We then characterize deliberation procedures that provide strong effort incentives in different productive environments \nOrganisateurs : \nJulien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)\n​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)\n​​​​​​​​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \nCommanditaires :\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/paula-onuchic-university-of-oxford-disclosure-and-incentives-in-teams/
LOCATION:CA
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics,Seminars
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR