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DTSTART:20180325T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20180612T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20180612T133000
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SUMMARY:Alex TETENOV (University of Bristol)  - "An Economic Theory of Statistical Testing"
DESCRIPTION:\nThe Microeconometrics Seminar: Every Tuesday at 12:15 pm.\nTime: 12:15 pm – 1:30 pm Attention reporté à 12:45\nDate: 12th of June 2018\nPlace: Room 3001.\nAlex TETENOV (University of Bristol)  – “An Economic Theory of Statistical Testing” \nAbstract: \nThis paper models the use of statistical hypothesis testing in regulatory approval. A privately informed agent proposes an innovation. Its approval is beneficial to the proponent\, but potentially detrimental to the regulator. The proponent can conduct a costly clinical trial to persuade the regulator. I show that the regulator can screen out all ex-ante undesirable proponents by committing to use a simple statistical test. Its level is the ratio of the trial cost to the proponent’s benefit from approval. In application to new drug approval\, this level is around 15% for an average Phase III clinical trial.\n \nOrganizers:\n\nLaurent DAVEZIES (Laboratoire de Microéconométrie-CREST)\nArne UHLENDORFF (Laboratoire de Microéconométrie-CREST)\nSponsors:\nCREST\n \n\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/toru-kitagawa-university-college-london-equality-minded-treatment-choice-2-3-2-2/
CATEGORIES:Applied Seminar,Economics,Microeconometrics,Seminars
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