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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
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DTSTART:20220327T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20220328T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20220328T133000
DTSTAMP:20260715T073215
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SUMMARY:Thomas LAMBERT (Rotterdam School of Management\, Erasmus University) "(In)dependent Central Banks"
DESCRIPTION:The Macroeconomics Seminar:\nTime: 12:15 pm – 13:30 pm\nDate: 28th of March 2022 \nRoom \nThomas LAMBERT (Rotterdam School of Management\, Erasmus University) “(In)dependent Central Banks” \nAbstract : Over the past three decades\, many countries reformed the institutional framework governing their central banks to increase their operational independence from the executive and elected politicians. Collecting systematic biographical information\, international press coverage\, and independent expert opinions\, we show that over the same period appointments of central bank governors have become more politically motivated\, especially after significant institutional reforms aiming to insulate central banks and their governors from political interference. We show that such politically motivated appointments are positively correlated with lack of de facto independence\, as measured by expert opinions and central bank governor turnover. \nOrganizers:\nAlessandro RIBONI (Polytechnique) \nSponsors:\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/thomas-lambert-rotterdam-school-of-management-erasmus-university-t-b-a/
CATEGORIES:Macroeconomics
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