BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CREST - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CREST
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://crest.science
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20250330T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20251026T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250924T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250924T133000
DTSTAMP:20260710T030824
CREATED:20250807T083153Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250923T051802Z
UID:18278-1758716100-1758720600@crest.science
SUMMARY:Pawel DOLIGALSKI (Bristol UK) - "Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design (with P. Dworczak\, M. Akbarpour and S. D. Kominers)"
DESCRIPTION:Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis\nHeure : 12h15 – 13h30\nDate : 24/09/2025\nSalle : 3001 \nPawel DOLIGALSKI (Bristol UK) – “Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design(with P. Dworczak\, M. Akbarpour and S. D. Kominers)” \nCV : Policymakers often distort goods markets to effect redistribution—for example\, via price controls\, differential taxation\, or in-kind transfers. We investigate the optimality of such policies alongside the (optimally-designed) income tax. In our framework\, agents differ in both their ability to generate income and their consumption preferences\, and a planner maximizes a social welfare function subject to incentive and resource constraints. We uncover a generalization of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem by showing that goods markets should be undistorted if the heterogeneous consumption tastes (i) do not affect the marginal utility of disposable income\, (ii) do not enter into the social welfare weights and (iii) are statistically independent of ability. We also show\, however\, that market interventions play a role in the optimal resolution of the equity-efficiency trade-off if any of the three assumptions is relaxed. In a special case of our model with linear utilities\, binary ability\, and continuous willingness to pay for a single good\, we characterize the globally optimal mechanism and show that it may feature means-tested consumption subsidies\, in-kind transfers\, and differential commodity taxation. \nOrganisateurs : \nJulien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)\n​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUANQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)\n​​​​​​​​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \nCommanditaires :\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/nikhil-vellodi-pse-tba/
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics,Seminars
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR