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PRODID:-//CREST - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20180325T010000
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DTSTART:20181028T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20180117T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20180117T133000
DTSTAMP:20260715T051528
CREATED:20171221T160126Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20171221T160126Z
UID:11993-1516191300-1516195800@crest.science
SUMMARY:Job Market Interview - Bary PRADELSKI (ETH Zurich) - "The assignment game: Decentralized dynamics\, rate of convergence and the value of information"
DESCRIPTION:\nJob Market Interview at 12:15 pm. \nTime: 12:15 pm – 1:30 pm\nDate: 17th of January 2018\nPlace: Room 3001. \nBary PRADELSKI (ETH Zurich) – “The assignment game: Decentralized dynamics\, rate of convergence and the value of information” \nAbstract: We study decentralized learning dynamics for the classic assignment game with transferable utility but without a central clearing house. At random points in time firms and workers match\, break up\, and re-match in the search for better opportunities. Agents employ uncoupled learning rules\, that is\, their strategies are not dependent on other agents’ payoffs or the structure of the game. We propose a simple learning process that converges to stable and optimal outcomes (the core). We then show that naïve strategies are inefficient\, that is\, the rate of convergence to core outcomes grows exponentially in the number of players. We then discuss behaviorally motivated learning rules that achieve efficiency. \n\n\nOrganizers:\nOlivier Gossner\, Pierre Boyer &  Morgane Cure (CREST) \nSponsors:\nCREST \nLunch registration: \nLink (before 14th of January 2018) \n\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/nicolas-drouhin-crest-ens-paris-saclay-tba-joint-work-with-tba-3-2-2/
CATEGORIES:Economics
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