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DTSTART:20170326T010000
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DTSTART:20171029T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20171213T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20171213T133000
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SUMMARY:Nicolas SCHUTZ (University of Mannheim) - "All-Pay Oligopoly Contests: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventories" joint work with Joao Montez
DESCRIPTION:\nThe Microeconomics Seminar: Every Wednesday at 12:15 pm. \nTime: 12:15 pm – 1:30 pm\nDate: 13th of December 2017\nPlace: Room 3001. \nNicolas SCHUTZ (University of Mannheim) – “All-Pay Oligopoly Contests: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventories” joint work with Joao Montez \nAbstract: We study a class of duopoly games where firms build costly unobservable inventories before setting prices. That class of games includes classic benchmark models (such as Varian’s model of sales\, Bertrand with asymmetric costs\, and Bertrand with fixed costs) as special cases. We show that\, if no firm has a significant advantage\, then the game has a generically unique equilibrium\, in which firms randomize their price choices and\, conditional on that price choice\, serve all their targeted demand. The payoff structure and equilibrium structure can be related to an all-pay contest with outside options and non-monotonic payoff functions. Moreover\, this unique equilibrium converges to a Bertrand equilibrium as inventory costs becomes fully recoverable. Thus\, standard and well-understood production-to-order outcomes can be seen as a special case of production-in-advance outcomes. \nPaper here \n\n\nOrganizers:\nMarie-Laure Allain\, Pierre Boyer\, Laurent Linnemer  &  Morgane Cure (CREST) \nSponsors:\nCREST \nLunch registration: \nLink (before 10th of December 2017) \n\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/nicolas-drouhin-crest-ens-paris-saclay-tba-joint-work-with-tba-2/
CATEGORIES:Economics,Microeconomics
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