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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
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TZID:Europe/Helsinki
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TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
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DTSTART:20190331T010000
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DTSTART:20191027T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20191118T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20191118T120000
DTSTAMP:20260713T023736
CREATED:20191025T101414Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210330T063351Z
UID:12352-1574074800-1574078400@crest.science
SUMMARY:Matias Nunez (CREST) - "A Solution to the Two-Person Implementation Problem"
DESCRIPTION:CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics :  \n\nTime: 11:00 am – 12:00 pm\nDate: 18th Nov. 2019\nPlace: Room 3105.\nMatias Nunez (CREST) – “A Solution to the Two-Person Implementation Problem”\n\nAbstract:\nWe propose a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler [1978] and Maskin [1999] according to which\, in two-person societies\, no Pareto efficient rule is Nash-implementable. To this end\, we consider implementation through mechanisms that are deterministic-in-equilibrium while lotteries are allowed off-equilibrium. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries\, we build simple veto mechanisms that Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover\, under mild richness conditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries\, any Pareto efficient Nashimplementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through one of our simple veto mechanisms. \n\nOrganizer: \n\n\nMorgane Guignard (CREST)\nSponsors:\nCREST\n\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/matias-nunez-crest-a-solution-to-the-two-person-implementation-problem/
LOCATION:3105
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