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DTSTART:20180325T010000
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DTSTART:20181028T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20181129T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20181129T120000
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CREATED:20181122T135949Z
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SUMMARY:Matias Nunez (CNRS\, Paris-Dauphine)   - "Approval Mechanisms: Theory and Experiments"
DESCRIPTION:CREST Microeconomics Seminar :  \n\nTime: 11:00 am – 12:00 pm\nDate:  29th November 2018\nPlace: Room 3001.\n\n  \n\nMatias Nunez (CNRS\, Paris-Dauphine) – “Approval Mechanisms: Theory and Experiments” \nAbstract: \nA committee of experts must decide on the value of a numerical variable (the interest rate for instance). Experts have different views on the value that should be adopted so that usual methods face a number of shortcomings\, such as allowing for manipulation or failing to give incentives for coordination. We design the class of Approval mechanisms which allow the experts to report ranges of values. We prove that these mechanisms admit a unique equilibrium outcome and hence are able to moderate the final decision. Moreover\, we test experimentally these mechanisms and give evidence that the experimental subjects prefer reporting ranges of values to the most conventional single-outcome announcements.\n \n\nOrganizers:\nRoxana Fernandez Machado (CREST)\, Marie Laure Allain (CREST)\, and Pierre Boyer (CREST)\nSponsors:\nCREST\nLunch registration:\nNo Food provided\n\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/matias-nunez-cnrs-paris-dauphine-approval-mechanisms-theory-and-experiments/
LOCATION:3001
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics
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