BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CREST - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CREST
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://crest.science
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20230326T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20231029T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20230927T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20230927T121500
DTSTAMP:20260711T024353
CREATED:20230726T073020Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230922T055728Z
UID:15298-1695816900-1695816900@crest.science
SUMMARY:Ludvig SINANDER (Oxford)  -  “The comparative statics of persuasion”
DESCRIPTION:Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis\n Heure : 12h15 – 13h30 \nDate : 27/09/2023 \nSalle : 3001 \nLudvig SINANDER (Oxford) – “The comparative statics of persuasion” – \nCV :  In the canonical persuasion model\, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it\, delineating which shifts of the sender’s interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first theorem identifies an ordinal notion of ‘increased convexity’ that we show characterises those shifts of the sender’s interim payoff that lead her optimally to choose no less informative signals. To strengthen this conclusion to ‘more informative’ requires further assumptions: our second theorem identifies the necessary and sufficient condition on the sender’s interim payoff\, which strictly generalises the ‘S’-shape commonly imposed in the literature. (Note: preliminary and incomplete.) \n  \nOrganisateurs : \nJulien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \n​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \n​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \nCommanditaires :\n CREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/ludvig-sinander-oxford-tba/
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR