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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20211115T121500
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SUMMARY:Jean BARTHELEMY  (Banque de France)\,  "How much commitment does a government need ?"
DESCRIPTION:The Macroeconomics Seminar:\nTime: 12:15 pm – 13:30 pm\nDate: 15th of November  2021 \nRoom : 1003 \nJean BARTHELEMY (Banque de France) “How much commitment does a government need ?” \nAbstract : “We determine how much commitment a government facing a large set of small private agents needs to uniquely implement its desired outcome. We show that a large commitment is needed: when the time-consistency problem it faces is severe\, when private agents need bold public actions to modify their decisions – for example due to deviations from rational expectations – or when the private sector can distort ex-post government’s incentives\, e.g. through trigger strategies. Otherwise\, a small commitment ability is sufficient for the government to implement its desired outcome. We derive implications for models of bailouts\, inflation bias\, and capital taxation.” \nJoint work : Eric MENGUS (HEC-Paris) \nOrganizers:\nJean-Baptiste MICHAU (Polytechnique-CREST) \nSponsors:\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/jean-barthelemy-banque-de-france-t-b-a/
CATEGORIES:Macroeconomics
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