BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CREST - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CREST
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://crest.science
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20260329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20261025T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260519T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20260519T133000
DTSTAMP:20260709T184109
CREATED:20260424T124154Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260511T093049Z
UID:18936-1779192900-1779197400@crest.science
SUMMARY:Luisa CEFALA (Cornell University) - "The Economic Consequences of Knowledge Hoarding"
DESCRIPTION:Applied Micro Seminar : Every Tuesday \nTime: 12:15 pm – 13:30 pm\nDate: May\, 19th\nRoom : 3001 \nLuisa CEFALA “The Economic Consequences of Knowledge Hoarding” \nAbstract :  \nSocial learning is an important source of knowledge diffusion in low-income countries. However\, the highly localized character of many labor markets could inhibit social learning by giving rise to incentives for individuals to hoard their knowledge. This paper studies the impact of knowledge hoarding on the diffusion of profitable skills and technologies in rural Burundi and measures its aggregate and distributional consequences for the village economy. In a field experiment covering 223 villages (labor markets)\, we encourage workers skilled in high-return agricultural technologies to share their knowledge with unskilled individuals. We randomize at the local labor market level whether the unskilled worker is a competitor (i.e.\, someone from the same labor market) and whether the training is about a technology with rivalrous rents (row planting\, which commands a wage premium in the labor market). We first establish that knowledge hoarding indeed reduces social learning. When incumbents are matched with an individual from the same labor market\, knowledge transmission occurs only 3% of the time\, but this figure reaches 43% if the unskilled worker is not a competitor. In contrast\, transmission of a technology with nonrivalrous rents (composting) is high regardless of the unskilled worker’s identity. Next\, we show that knowledge hoarding creates winners and losers: By hoarding knowledge\, incumbents earn 6% more\, and the skilled equilibrium wage is 3% higher. In contrast\, unskilled workers’ earnings and farm output are 7% and 20% lower\, respectively. Overall\, knowledge hoarding reduces technology adoption by over 20%\, suggesting substantial yield losses. %The number of days in row-planting employment is 16% higher\, and the share of row-planted fields increases by 27%\, suggesting estimated yield gains of 9%. Finally\, our results suggest that fear of social sanction is a mechanism that sustains knowledge hoarding among the incumbents\, highlighting how social ties can foster social learning but also inhibit it when knowledge diffusion threatens incumbents’ rents. \n  \nOrganizers:\nBenoît SCHMUTZ (Pôle économie du CREST)\nClément MALGOUYRES (Pôle économie du CREST) \nSponsors:\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/https-luisacef-github-io/
CATEGORIES:Applied Seminar,Seminars
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR