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TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
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DTSTART:20220327T010000
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DTSTART:20221030T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20220411T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20220411T134500
DTSTAMP:20260711T191409
CREATED:20220316T065001Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220405T121659Z
UID:13503-1649680200-1649684700@crest.science
SUMMARY:Eric MENGUS (HEC) "Optimal Price Level Determination by Short-Run Redistribution Policies"
DESCRIPTION:The Macroeconomics Seminar:\nTime: 12:30 pm – 13:45 pm\nDate: 11 th of April 2022 \nRoom 3001 \nEric MENGUS (HEC) “Optimal Price Level Determination by Short-Run Redistribution Policies ” \nAbstract : To what extent do typical fiscal objectives such as redistribution or financing public expenditures deter a public authority from ensuring a stable value to money? This paper investigates this question in overlapping generation economies where inefficient inequality may emerge as households save in storage instead of money. We show that the sequence of fiscally-backed money purchases that minimizes current inequality also selects a unique equilibrium – one in which money is traded at the efficient intertemporal price – as a by- product. With a sufficiently large fiscal-backing capacity\, public incentives in money trading cannot be distorted by any additional public spending need. When fiscal capacity is bounded\, however\, public incentives for money trading are time-inconsistent\, which leads to multiple equilibria insofar a Laffer curve in seigniorage emerges. \nOrganizers:\nJean-Baptiste MICHAU (Polytechnique) \nSponsors:\nCREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/eric-mengus-hec-t-b-a/
CATEGORIES:Macroeconomics
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