BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CREST - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CREST
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://crest.science
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CREST
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20230326T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20231029T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20230405T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20230405T133000
DTSTAMP:20260711T074028
CREATED:20230328T062820Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230328T062820Z
UID:14795-1680696900-1680701400@crest.science
SUMMARY:BLOCH Francis (PSE)  - "Attack and interception in networks" (with B Dutta and K Chatterjee)
DESCRIPTION:Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis\n Heure : 12h15 – 13h30 \nDate : 05/04/2023 \nSalle : 3001 \nBLOCH Francis (PSE) – “Attack and interception in networks” (with B Dutta and K Chatterjee) \nCV : This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network\, where a single attacker chooses a  target and a path\, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker – a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess’s paradox in transportation economics. Finally\, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the model: one where all nodes cooperate in interception and one where nodes update their beliefs and make inspection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object. \nOrganisateurs : \nJulien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \n​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \n​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST) \nCommanditaires :\n CREST \n
URL:https://crest.science/event/bloch-francis-pse-attack-and-interception-in-networks-with-b-dutta-and-k-chatterjee/
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR