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DTSTART:20170326T010000
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DTSTART:20171029T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20171017T120000
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SUMMARY:Andreas LANDMANN (Paris School of Economics) - "Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from a RCT in Pakistan"
DESCRIPTION:\nThe Microeconometrics Seminar: Every Tuesday at 12:00 pm.\nTime: 12:00 pm – 1:15 pm\nDate: 17th of October 2017\nPlace: Room 3001.\nAndreas LANDMANN (Paris School of Economics) – “Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health Insurance Markets: Evidence from a RCT in Pakistan” \nAbstract: Around the world\, there is a growing interest to provide insurance policies to low-income households. Selection of high-risk individuals into the insurance pool is an often cited impediment for the sustainability of such schemes\, though. We provide robust evidence on the presence of adverse selection from a large randomized control trial on health insurance in rural Pakistan. Our experimental setup allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard\, to estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand curve and to test measures against adverse selection. The results suggest that there is substantial adverse selection if health insurance coverage can be individually assigned. In particular\, adverse selection tends to become worse with higher premium prices\, creating a trade-off between cost recovery and the quality of the insurance pool. In contrast\, adverse selection is mitigated when bundling insurance policies at the household or higher levels. Further analyses suggest that adverse selection in individual products has non-negligible welfare consequences and that these are less pronounced in relative terms when bundling policies. \nOrganizers:\n\nLaurent DAVEZIES (Laboratoire de Microéconométrie-CREST)\nArne UHLENDORFF (Laboratoire de Microéconométrie-CREST)\nSponsors:\nCREST\n \n\n
URL:https://crest.science/event/andreas-landmann-paris-school-of-economics-adverse-selection-in-low-income-health-insurance-markets-evidence-from-a-rct-in-pakistan/
CATEGORIES:Applied Seminar,Economics,Microeconometrics,Seminars
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