

ALFONSO MONTES

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Placement Director: Francis Kramatz
Graduate Coordinator: Thibaud Vergé

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EDUCATION

- Ph.D in Economics, Ecole Polytechnique** *2016 - Present*
Dissertation Title: “Topics in Bayesian Games”
Expected completion date: 09/2020
- MSc in Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics** *2015 - 2016*
Dissertation Title: “Bayesian Persuasion with Rational Inattentive Receiver”
- Master in Economics (highest distinction), Universidad de Chile** *2012 - 2014*
Dissertation Title: “Integrated Tax Systems and the Cost of Capital”
- Bachelor in Economics (distinction), Universidad de Chile** *2007 - 2011*
Universidad de Chile

REFERENCES

Olivier GOSSNER
Ecole Polytechnique, CNRS
5 ave Le Chatelier
91120 Palaiseau, France
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Tristan TOMALA
HEC, CNRS
1 rue de la Liberation
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Yukio KORIYAMA
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RESEARCH FIELDS

Primary Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory.
Secondary Field: Political Economy.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENTS

Data Analyst Inter-American Development Bank	2016 - 2017
Data Analyst Development Planning Unit, University College London	2015 - 2016
Research Assistant, Professor Ramon Lopez (PhD) Universidad de Chile, Economics Department, Chile	2014 - 2015
Research Assistant, Professor Pablo Serra (PhD) Universidad de Chile, Economics Department, Chile	2013 - 2014

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- Econometric Society Winter Meeting (forthcoming), Micro Theory 2019
- Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST), Internal Seminar 2019
- Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST), PhD Seminar 2019
- Stony Brook International Conference in Game Theory 2018

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Courses taught as Teacher Assistant

- Intermediate Microeconomics, Ecole Polytechnique (Undergraduate). Fall 2018/2019 Teaching Professor Thibaud Verge. Bachelor Program.
- Introduction to Economics, Ecole Polytechnique (Undergraduate). Spring 2018. Teaching Professor Olivier Gossner and Jean Baptiste Mischeau. Engineering track.
- Microeconomics, Universidad de Chile (Postgraduate). Fall 2013. Teaching Professor Oscar Landerretche. Course for the Master in Public Policy.
- Microeconomics II, Universidad de Chile (Undergraduate). Fall 2010/2011/2012. Teaching Professor Jorge Rivera. Standard course in microeconomics.
- Microeconomics I, Universidad de Chile (Undergraduate). Spring 2010/2011. Teaching Professor Jorge Rivera. Standard course in microeconomics.
- Resources Allocation and Welfare Economics, Universidad de Chile (Undergraduate). Fall 2010/2011. Teaching Professor Javier Nunez. Fourth year course in economics.

Courses taught as Lecturer

- Mathematical Methods for Economics III, Universidad de Chile (Undergraduate). Standard course in Calculus and Linear Algebra.
- Microeconomics I, Universidad Federico Santa Maria, Engineering School (Undergraduate). Standard course in microeconomics.

SCHOLARSHIPS

- Full academic scholarship for PhD in Economics, Ecole Polytechnique. 2019-2020
- Full academic scholarship for PhD in Economics, Ecole Polytechnique. 2016-2019
- Full academic scholarship for MSc in Applicable Mathematics, LSE. 2012-2014
- Full academic scholarship for MA in Economics, Universidad de Chile. 2012-2014

RESEARCH PAPERS

- **“Canonical Equilibrium in Games with Endogenous Information Structures”. (Job Market Paper)**

I study finite games of incomplete information in which players choose the information they acquire. Information acquisition is costly, and the cost is increasing in the reduction of their uncertainty. First, each agent chooses an arbitrary *signal* about a state of nature. Then, once information has been designed, agents engage in a Bayesian Game. I show that for every equilibrium there exists an *equivalent* pure strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium in which the space of signals is equal to the action space. The existence of such equilibrium, which I call *canonical equilibrium*, provides a *revelation principle* for games with costly information acquisition. Canonical equilibria allows the analyst to find an equilibrium where signals recommend pure actions and those actions are followed by the players. Then, I prove existence of equilibrium. Finally, I show how standard results in single-agent information acquisition can be extended to strategic environments.

- **“Bayesian Persuasion with Rational Inattentive Receiver”**. Working Paper. 2019. R&R at the Journal of Economic Theory.

This paper extends the basic Bayesian Persuasion setup by allowing the receiver, after observing the information disclosed by the sender, to gather additional information. Information gathering is costly for the receiver, but it is not for the sender. The cost of information extraction is assumed to be proportional to the reduction of his uncertainty (as measured by the entropy of his beliefs). The cost is parametrized by a scalar, which I take as receiver’s ability to gather information. I analyze the impact of changes in receiver’s ability of gathering information on the well being of both, sender and receiver. On the one hand, I show that the sender cannot be better off if the receiver’s ability of gathering information increases. On the other hand, and in contrast with straightforward intuition, I show that the receiver may be worse off when he is better at gathering information. The reason is that more ability to gather information could lead the sender to provide less information in order to prevent the receiver from choosing a particular action. This in turn could imply less total information disclosed at equilibrium, making the receiver to be worse off.

SKILLS, LANGUAGES AND OTHER

Software Skills

MATLAB, STATA, Java, L^AT_EX, Microsoft Office.

Language

Spanish (Native), English (Academic, Fluent), French (Intermediate, A2)

Citizenship

Chilean