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Antoine CAMOUS (University of Mannheim) “Benefits and Credibility of Extended Commitments “
December 3, 12:15 pm - 1:30 pm
Time: 12:15pm – 13:30pm
Date: 03th of December 2018
Place: Room 3001
Antoine CAMOUS (University of Mannheim) “Benefits and Credibility of Extended Commitments ”
Abstract : Extended commitments refer to monetary strategies designed to incentivize a fiscal authority to undertake a specific course of action. To study these measures, we consider a standard monetary-fiscal environment, where the central bank has a (partial) commitment technology, while fiscal decisions are taken sequentially. Can a central bank design interventions to discipline the fiscal authority? Are these strategies credible? Our analysis relates how the level and nature of public debt influences the design and credibility of such strategies.
Joint work with Dmitry Matveev (Bank of Canada)